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Abstract 
This paper examines how, to what extent and why the EU engages in cultural diplomacy 
vis-à-vis the US. While providing an empirical review of and conceptual reflection on the 
current state of the EU’s (including key member states’) efforts at employing cultural 
diplomacy vis-à-vis the US, the paper also strives to explain the forms of this activity. It 
argues that a multi-level EU cultural diplomacy in the US does exist, but that its potential is 
currently underused. As could be expected, the EU Delegation to the US seems to be most 
willing to pursue EU cultural diplomacy, whereas the extent of EU cultural diplomacy at the 
level of coordinated activities between the EU and the member states, as well as at the 
member state level remains low. This finding can be explained primarily with a latent 
competition between member states. While the general motivation to engage in cultural 
diplomacy can be interest- or value-driven – and is in the case of EU cultural diplomacy vis-
à-vis the US arguably both –, it is undeniable that, in a country like the US, the interest-
driven soft power competition that is often a key incentive for actors to engage in cultural 
diplomacy activities at all plays out negatively inside the EU. These findings are 
corroborated by a brief discussion of the potential acceptance of EU cultural action in the 
US, which highlights how, despite positive perceptions of European culture as such, the EU 
is hardly recognized as an actor in the field of culture. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Culture is often said to play a central role in the transatlantic relationship, understood here 
as the relations between the United States and the European Union (EU), including its 
member states. For most of the post-WWII period, hardly any relevant public intervention 
by a key political figure from either side of the Atlantic missed out on conjuring the 
‘cultural ties that bind us so closely’, to quote an expression used in an emblematic speech 
by the General Secretary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Fogh 
Rasmussen 2014).  
 
Though oft-evoked in political discourse, the supposed strong transatlantic cultural 
linkages have hardly been scrutinized by policy analysts (for exceptions, see Menon 2013; 
Lucarelli 2006). They simply seem to be taken for granted – essentially for two reasons. 
First, the United States and the EU have long been said to form a community of ‘shared 
values’ related to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and a liberal market economy 
(Deutsch et al. 1957). These values were grounded in common cultural references and 
underpinned the legal-political foundations of societies on both sides of the Atlantic, 
influencing their foreign policy agendas in ways that often allowed for a convergence of 
positions embodied in the support for the post-war global order in the security (NATO), 
economic (Bretton Woods institutions) and other policy (United Nations bodies) domains. 
Second, the history of the US as a country of immigration, initially primarily from the other 
side of the Atlantic, has implied that many Americans with roots in Europe have felt a 
strong cultural and emotional affinity with the European continent (Tocci & Alcaro 2014). 
 
Both these motivations for presupposing the existence of a transatlantic cultural 
community are currently challenged. Political forces on each side of the Atlantic have 
begun to question the ‘Western order’ and the processes of globalization that it has 
allowed for and underpinned. Donald Trump’s election as US President based on anti-
liberal and anti-globalization rhetoric, garnished with a good dose of anti-Europeanism, 
best exemplifies this trend, placing a severe strain on transatlantic relations. This goes at 
least for the relations with the EU institutions, but also with the governments of key EU 
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member states.2 The resulting challenges to the shared values underpinning transatlantic 
relations are exacerbated by changing demographics: the supposed ‘link generated by a 
common cultural heritage is waning as the cohort of American[s] … who served in Europe 
dwindles and US-born citizens of European descent reach an umpteenth generation’ (ibid.: 
381). 
 
While it is possible that Trump’s presidency will be remembered as exceptional and 
followed by a reinvigorated US-EU relationship, the currently observable transatlantic 
divergence is part of a longer trend. In past decades, talk about transatlantic cultural ties 
has often served to cover up existing discontent and tensions in transatlantic relations 
(Danchev 2005). Trump’s predecessor Obama, who proclaimed himself ‘America’s first 
Pacific president’ (Obama 2009), demonstrated a certain neglect for Europe during most of 
his two terms in office. Before him, George W. Bush had alienated many Europeans by 
unilaterally going to war in Iraq, laying bare profound transatlantic value differences and 
provoking a drift in transatlantic relations (alongside rifts inside the EU) (Levy et al. 2005).  
 
All these trends towards a widening of the transatlantic gap have also shown in opinion 
polls. Already for 2014, the German Marshall Fund of the US (GMFUS 2015: 22) noted that 
the ‘Transatlantic Relationship Cools Noticeably on European Side’, indicating a steep 
increase – to an average of 50% – in the number of Europeans who wished to see greater 
independence from the US. Most recently, the polls indicate further alienation, with steep 
drops in the number of people who have ‘favorable views’ of the United States, notably in 
the larger European countries (Germany: 35%, France: 46%; Pew Research Center 2017). 
Vice-versa, US visions of the European Union are often based on limited awareness and 
knowledge of its political and institutional set-up. In 2015, a survey commissioned by the 
European Commission found that among the EU’s ten strategic partner countries, the US 
was the country with the second-lowest awareness of the EU after Canada (Public Policy 
and Management Institute et al. 2015). 
 
                                               
2 Trump’s discourse seems to resonate more within EU countries that are themselves undergoing 
transformations towards – in Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán’s words – ‘illiberal democracies’, such as Hungary 
and Poland (Orbán 2014). 
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While none of these polls provide conclusive evidence for the strength of transatlantic 
cultural ties, which is notoriously hard to measure, the above trends do point towards the 
observation that claims of ‘cultural proximity’ and the appeal to ‘shared values’ in 
transatlantic relations require closer scrutiny. It seems therefore necessary and timely to 
investigate to what extent the EU and the US are engaged in relations focused on culture 
to examine whether and to what extent ‘soft power’ is at play in this bilateral relationship. 
Soft power, ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or 
payment’ (Nye 2004: 5), relies heavily on the attraction potential of culture. Especially at 
times of political tension, it can provide an important means for reinforcing a relationship. 
 
Focusing on the EU perspective, this paper examines how, to what extent and why the EU 
engages in cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis the United States. While providing an empirical 
review of and conceptual reflection on the current state of the EU’s (including key member 
states’) efforts at employing cultural diplomacy (CD) vis-à-vis the US, the paper also strives 
to explain the forms of this activity. In so doing, it does not only contribute to a better 
understanding of an understudied aspect of transatlantic relations, but also embeds itself 
into a debate about the EU’s emerging cultural diplomacy, which has recently been 
boosted with the desire to work ‘Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural 
Relations’, as expressed in the title of a 2016 Joint Communication by the European 
Commission and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (EC & High 
Representative 2016; see, for an overview, EL-CSID 2018, Schunz 2018). While the Union 
generally recognizes the potential of cultural relations with third countries, its strategic 
debate is focused notably on its neighborhood, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, but 
also China. Reflecting the abovementioned trends, North America is rather absent from 
these debates, even if the Union and many of its members do of course engage in cultural 
activities on the continent, including in the US (Fisher 2014). Given the limited scholarly 
attention paid to these activities (see, however, Davis Cross 2014), this paper thus strives to 
fill an empirical and conceptual research gap with regard to EU cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis 
a major developed country partner. In so doing, it aims to contribute to the emerging 
literature on the EU’s cultural diplomacy, employing a framework inspired by the concept 
of ‘actorness’ (Bretherton & Vogler 2006; Kingah & Van Langenhove 2012).  
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To do so, and respond to the above research questions, the paper proceeds as follows: 
first, it outlines an analytical framework by providing key definitions, disentangling the 
conceptual field surrounding ‘cultural relations and diplomacy’ by taking inspiration from 
foreign policy analysis, and offering a few methodological pointers. In its main part, the 
paper then answers the question how and to what extent the EU engages in transatlantic 
cultural activities. It argues that an EU cultural diplomacy in the US does exist, but that its 
potential is currently underused. By briefly discussing the potential acceptance of EU 
cultural diplomacy by US elites and general audiences, it also highlights the lack of 
recognition of the EU as an actor in the domain of culture. In the subsequent section, the 
current form of EU transatlantic cultural diplomacy is explained with the EU’s and its 
member states’ desire to be perceived as an attractive partner by the US, which is however 
constrained by EU member states’ subtle competition for US attention. Synthesizing the 
findings, the conclusion offers a future-oriented reflection on the effectiveness of the EU’s 
transatlantic CD. 
 
 
2. Analytical framework 
2.1. Defining EU cultural diplomacy 
The term ‘cultural diplomacy’ has been at the centre of debates in both academia and 
policy-making for decades. An agreed definition is far off, as interpretations diverge along 
two axes, concerning the ‘cultural’ and ‘diplomacy’ components of the term (see e.g. 
Gienow-Hecht 2010).  
 
On the one hand, the term ‘diplomacy’ might suggest restricting the reach of the concept 
to relations that are explicitly guided by governmental agents, as opposed to (cultural) 
relations between nations and their peoples that ‘grow naturally and organically, without 
government intervention’ (Arndt 2005: xviii). Over time, however, the concept has 
increasingly been enlarged to include both dimensions, and thus also people-to-people 
contacts and cultural actions developed by private and civil society actors (Isar 2010). On 
the other hand, visions of how and what ‘culture’, broadly defined as a ‘set of distinctive 
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spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group … that … 
encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value 
systems, traditions and beliefs’ (UNESCO 1982), should be used in diplomatic contexts 
differ. A narrow definition of CD would perceive it as a process of displaying a country’s 
cultural production in an effort to enhance its image and political clout vis-à-vis another 
country. This idea of the use of culture in external relations is tied to the notion of soft 
power, in a world where ’the ability to affect what other countries want tends to be 
associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions’ (Nye 
1990). However, the use of culture in external relations can also take a broader, more 
interactive and participatory form in the target country, by involving local cultural actors in 
processes of co-creation and mutual exchange. From this perspective, culture has a role in 
supporting economic and social development and can take the form of capacity-building 
activities in the cultural sector, cultural exchanges and intercultural dialogue (Isar 2010).  
 
In the European Union context, various terminologies, including the notion of ‘international 
cultural relations’ (ICR) employed in the 2016 Joint Communication, but also ‘cultural 
diplomacy’, co-exist (Trobbiani 2017). The Union’s preference for employing the more 
neutral term of ICR can be explained by two forms of resistances to the notion of ‘cultural 
diplomacy’: some member states prefer not to see the Union engage in any form of 
‘diplomacy’ in this policy domain3, whereas many cultural stakeholders are reluctant to be 
co-opted into EU foreign policy (Isar 2010). The distinction between various terms is less 
salient for scholarly enquiry. Once cultural stakeholders make use of EU funding and 
technical support, they take part in implementing EU policy objectives, regardless of 
whether they perceive themselves as EU agents or not. In this sense, the agents of EU CD 
can be very diverse, and so can be the types of cultural activities they undertake. While this 
contribution focuses on governmental initiatives and not so much on the ‘transnational 
transatlantic’, it considers all of the following CD instruments: cultural exchange and 
dialogue (e.g. mobility programmes), cultural display and informational tools (e.g. 
                                               
3 According to Article 6 TFEU, the EU only has the competence to support, coordinate or supplement member 
states’ policies in the cultural domain. 
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information sources including new media), capacity-building (e.g. supporting libraries) and 
language teaching (Maaß 2015). 
 
Relying on a broad definition of culture in a foreign policy analysis context, this paper 
understands ‘EU culture’ as in the way it is defined in the EU treaties, namely as comprising 
tangible and intangible cultures of EU member states and the EU’s own ‘common cultural 
heritage’ (Article 167(1) TFEU, see also Calligaro 2014).  
 
The EU as a cultural actor can therefore present itself as both an embodiment of a shared 
history and as the defendant of European cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. CD 
in an EU context represents thus the deliberate use of culture as defined above in external 
relations, either for its own sake (for traditional cultural policy goals) or in support of 
foreign policy objectives based on a range of activities and conducted by agents including 
the EU institutions, its member states and cultural actors when they implement EU goals. 
The foreign policy objectives that the EU pursues can be related to the promotion of its 
image or specific interests, but also EU values such as democracy and especially the notion 
of cultural diversity, embodied in the Union’s motto ‘unity in diversity’. 
 
2.2. Analyzing EU cultural diplomacy 
To analyse EU cultural diplomacy as the recent foreign policy activity of a non-traditional 
foreign policy actor, it can be useful to draw on the insights of two sets of literatures: 
foreign policy analysis as applied to the EU (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014), which allows for 
treating CD as a form of foreign policy, and regionalism studies, which help to account for 
the specificity of the EU as a global player in the making (Kingah & Van Langenhove 2012).  
 
In EU foreign policy analysis, a key debate revolves around the question of ‘actorness’, that 
is the EU’s capacity to act externally, which in an area of supplementary competence like 
culture is still evolving (Schunz 2018). Actorness examines the external context of EU action 
(‘opportunity’), its own ‘presence’, as well as its ‘capability’, that is, ‘the internal context of 
EU external action’ (Bretherton & Vogler 2006: 29). Actorness per se only indicates whether 
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the EU can act externally in a given context, but does not propose to examine how it acts, 
nor whether its action yields impacts.  
 
While the ‘opportunity’ for EU external cultural action in the US is briefly discussed at the 
beginning of the analysis for contextualization purposes, emphasis is placed here on the 
notions of presence and capability. Expanding on these aspects of actorness from a 
broader regionalism perspective, Van Langenhove and colleagues propose an analytical 
framework that assesses these two dimensions by expanding on what they term 
‘willingness’ and ‘capacity’, while also adding considerations on the ‘acceptance’ of 
regional organisations (Kingah et al. 2016; Kingah & Van Langenhove 2012; Zwartjes et al. 
2012). The ‘willingness’ of a regional organisation (but also a state) to pursue certain 
targets and courses of action – such as cultural diplomacy – can be examined based on the 
existence of strategic policy documents, legal texts as well as declarations by key policy-
makers indicating targets and support for the broader policy. Its ‘capacity’ relates to the 
institutionalization of policy activities, and the human, financial, institutional and technical 
resources devoted to pursuing policy goals. Capacity here transcends the mere notion of 
Bretherton and Vogler’s ‘capability’ and is understood more broadly as incorporating 
presence and both the potential for action and the actual use of that potential. Left outside 
of this core analysis, ‘acceptance’ depicts the reception of this regional actor’s policies by 
national and local stakeholders as well as citizens of a target country. Just like 
‘opportunity’, acceptance can only be briefly discussed here to contextualize the findings. 
Rather than a measurement of the ‘impact’ of EU action, which faces obstacles both in 
terms of reliable methodologies and means available for this research, ‘acceptance’ adds a 
dynamic and policy-specific reflection on the EU’s perceived actorness, clarifying the 
opportunities and constraints presented by the external context. This differentiates the 
current framework from approaches analysing ‘impact’ as part of ‘EU performance’, usually 
in narrower and already structured policy domains, or on particular occasions such as 
negotiations on a specific treaty (Blavoukos 2015; Blavoukos & Bourantonis 2017).  
 
These conceptual considerations yield the framework for analysing EU CD in the US, 
including the indicators for each of the criteria, depicted in Box 1.  
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Box 1: Analyzing EU cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis the United States 
(CONTEXT – External opportunity for EU external cultural action vis-à-vis the US) 
 
CORE ANALYSIS: EU CULTURAL DIPLOMACY 
 
1. Willingness for EU external cultural action vis-à-vis the US 
1.1 Target-setting: Inclusion of cultural diplomacy objectives in relevant legal and policy documents 
1.2 Support: Presence of committed leaders in EU institutions and/or member states (‘policy entrepreneurs’)  
2. Capacity for EU external cultural action vis-à-vis the US 
2.1 Institutionalization: Establishment of institutions/agencies dedicated to promoting CD objectives in the US   
2.2 Agency: Engaged and skilled human resources to support cultural diplomacy objectives in the US 
        2.3 Means and instruments: Financial resources and instruments to pursue CD objectives, including: cultural  
        exchange and dialogue, cultural display and informational tools, capacity-building and language teaching 
 
(CONTEXT: Acceptance of EU cultural action in and by the US) 
3.1 Public acceptance: Committed citizenry in the US 
3.2 Elite acceptance: Buy-in from cultural and political stakeholders in the US 
 
Source: adapted from Bretherton & Vogler 2006; Kingah et al. 2016; Kingah & Van Langenhove 2012 
 
Given the EU’s multi-level character and the supplementary nature of its legal competence 
on culture, a further distinction needs to be made between three levels of policy-making in 
order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of EU CD vis-à-vis the US: the EU level, the 
level of coordinated efforts that brings together the member states and EU institutions, 
and the EU member states level. All three levels contribute to a broadly defined EU CD. 
Willingness and capacity are therefore examined through sub-sections dedicated to:  
 
(i) EU policies defined by EU institutions and bodies, and mainly sustained by the 
EU budget and human and technical resources;  
(ii) coordinated efforts among member states, partly with support from the EU, 
through the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) network or 
other arrangements;  
(iii) actions by ‘the big three’ EU member states, Germany, France and the UK4, 
analysed in a comparative perspective.  
 
While these levels de facto complement each other, and thus combine into the EU’s broad 
CD, the analytical distinction between them helps to uncover patterns of EU CD, 
                                               
4 As a more extensive analysis of EU members states’ cultural diplomacies would go beyond the scope of this 
contribution, emphasis is placed on France, Germany and the UK given their important CD resources in general 
and in the US. 
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particularly the degree of willingness and the extent of potential and actually used capacity 
at each of the levels.  
 
As a heuristic device, we posit that the degree of willingness can be strong, medium or 
weak, depending on whether there are very clearly circumscribed and explicit EU CD 
targets supported by a strong group of policy entrepreneurs (strong), some targets and a 
certain support for them (medium), or very few clear or even no targets and little support 
for EU CD (weak). In a similar vein, the capacity of EU CD at each of the levels can be 
considered as strong if they are solidly institutionalized, supported by a considerable 
number of dedicated and active staff, and relying on a set of tailor-made instruments. If 
there is some form of institutionalization, supported by some staff and means, this capacity 
is medium. In cases of limited institutional anchorage, limited to no staff and means, it is 
weak. The extent of EU CD then depends on a qualitative assessment combining the two 
factors, and can be high (if one dimension is strong and the other at least medium), 
moderate (if both are medium) or low (if at least one is weak and none is strong).  
 
The understanding of EU transatlantic cultural diplomacy obtained through this analysis 
answers the ‘how’ and ‘to what extent’ parts of the research question, providing a clear 
picture of the types of activities and their strengths. To answer the question ‘why’ the EU 
engages in cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis the US (and why in the way it does), the contribution 
draws on recent attempts to explain EU external engagement in ‘soft power’ domains like 
culture or science (Schunz 2018; López de San Román & Schunz 2018). They argue that EU 
external action emerges as a result of policy entrepreneurs mobilizing in response to 
external incentives, either on the basis of interests and a logic of consequence or of norms 
and a logic of appropriateness (or a combination of both).  
 
Expanding on that literature, and in analogy to the academic debate about ‘science 
diplomacy’, which distinguishes between ‘science for diplomacy’ (the use of science and 
research to pursue diplomatic goals) and ‘diplomacy for science’ (the use of diplomatic 
means to promote a country’s science and research-related policy objectives) (Royal 
Society 2010), (EU) cultural diplomacy can take three different forms embodying different 
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underlying rationales for engaging in CD. These forms are distinct when it comes to the 
objectives pursued, the instruments employed and the target audiences aimed at (see 
Table 1). First, ‘diplomacy for culture’ depicts the use of diplomatic means to promote a 
country’s (or the EU’s) cultural policy objectives only. Here, diplomacy becomes 
instrumental for the purpose of promoting the normative objective of fostering cultural 
exchange and cooperation based on a respect for cultural diversity. It usually involves a 
government-initiated framework stipulating bottom-up dynamics, with cultural actors 
driving exchanges and deciding on contents. Second, CD can also take the form of ‘culture 
for diplomacy’, which involves an instrumental use of culture. As a vehicle, culture can be 
used for two main purposes: on the one hand, it can be employed as soft power projection 
for (nation-)branding, responding to a desire to pursue material interests in a competitive 
context and targeting both elites and broader publics in a third country by showcasing 
one’s culture; on the other hand, culture can be a vehicle to attain other external policy 
objectives. This implies targeting specific audiences and linking culture to a particular issue 
(e.g. climate change) in order to draw attention to that issue or promote cooperation on 
that basis. Culture for diplomacy usually involves rather strong governmental steering.  
 
Table 1: Forms of (EU) cultural diplomacy 
 Diplomacy for culture Culture for diplomacy 
 Diplomacy for the  
sake of cultural policy  
Culture for the sake of 
EU-/nation-branding  
Culture for the sake of 
other external policies  
Objectives Cultural policy objectives Soft power projection External policy goals 
beyond culture 
Typical 
instruments 
Grants for cooperation  
and exchange projects;  
mobility programmes 
Events (exhibitions); 
capacity-building; 
language courses 
Issue-linkage via 
specific events;  
flagship projects 
Target audiences Cultural actors;  
broader public 
Elites;  
broader public 
Issue-specific elites; 
(broader public)  
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
As these three forms of cultural diplomacy follow different logics, understanding which of 
the logics dominates – by way of engaging in ‘pattern-matching’ between the above 
expected patterns and the observed patterns of EU action (Yin 1984) – helps to explain the 
main motivations for why CD is pursued in the way it is. This is not to imply, however, that 
these logics are mutually exclusive. A single actor can be engaged in various forms of CD 
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activities: as norm-driven promoter of cultural diversity, as image booster, and as issue-
linker using culture to pursue other external policy aims.  
 
In methodological terms, the contribution relies on document analysis and a set of semi-
structured interviews, which are complemented by secondary literature. At the three levels 
of analysis, the analyzed documents include fundamental texts (legal texts, other official 
documents, website information) regarding both the analyzed actors’ cultural diplomacy 
strategies in general and their culture-focused relations with the US. They were selected as 
a result of a search for guidelines by the EU, EUNIC and each of the three member states 
for the use of culture vis-à-vis the US, as well as for data on resources and instruments 
mobilized in the pursuit of this goal. Additionally, five semi-structured interviews were 
conducted between September 2017 and February 2018 with officials from the EU 
Delegation to the US, EU member state ministries and representatives from EUNIC Global 
and EUNIC USA (see Annex). The interviewees were selected for being high-ranking 
representatives in charge of cultural relations between their organization and the US 
(Goethe-Institut, Alliance Française, EUNIC Global) or key officials specifically tasked with 
culture within a broader organization operating in the US (EU Delegation, German 
Embassy in Washington, DC). In the case of the British Council (UK), no interview was 
conducted, but key information was obtained via e-mail. The analysis focuses on the most 
recent past and spans from 2011, the year of the launch of the EU Preparatory Action for 
Culture in External Relations (see European Parliament 2011) to 2017, occasionally making 
reference to the period 20075 to 2011.  
 
 
3. Understanding EU cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis the United States 
 
This section discusses the EU’s and its key member states’ cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis the 
US, starting with a brief consideration of the ‘opportunity’ for such activities, before 
focusing on willingness and capacity by distinguishing between the EU level and the levels 
                                               
5 The 2007 Commission Communication ‘European agenda for culture in a globalizing world’, is widely 
perceived to have opened the current process of policy formulation on the use of culture in EU external 
relations.  
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of coordinated and individual member states’ activities. It concludes with a short discussion 
of the acceptance of the EU as cultural actor in the US. 
 
3.1. Opportunity 
The United States of America provide a promising but challenging external context and 
target country for cultural diplomacy activities in general, and for those of the EU in 
particular.  
 
On the one hand, given its federal system of government, as well as the high degrees of 
freedom enjoyed by the cultural sector in the US, there are a priori many points of 
attachment for interaction with US governmental and especially societal actors as well as 
citizens (Fisher 2014). Moreover, as a liberal and open country of immigration, the United 
States have historically stood for (cultural) pluralism and openness to the world. Migrants 
have shaped the ‘melting pot’ that is the US, and many of them stemmed from Europe. 
According to the latest available data, around 42 million Americans trace back their roots 
to Germany, 30 million to Ireland, 25 million to the UK, 15 million to Italy, 9 million to 
Poland and 8 million to France (US Census Bureau 2000). These are remarkable numbers 
prone to facilitate the access of European countries when it comes to promoting their 
culture, including language, in the United States. 
 
On the other hand, as indicated earlier, not only are these demographics changing, 
imposing the need to address novel audiences, such as the growing population with Latin 
American origins in the US, but it is an altogether daunting challenge to be having to 
promote the EU as a supranational entity to which no US citizen may feel emotionally 
attached. What is more, the political differences between the US and its long-time Western 
allies are becoming more pronounced. While the political polarization of US society, and 
with it the resistance to ‘liberal’ ideas, predates the Trump Presidency, the latter makes 
trends that complicate any form of European cultural diplomacy in the country more 
visible. One such trend concerns the growing strength of fundamentalist religious 
movements (see e.g. Christerson and Flory 2017), which stands emblematically for an 
accentuation of cultural differences between Europe and the US. Moreover, this 
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polarization finds its geographical expression in the divide between a more liberal, 
outward-looking population on the East and West Coasts and a more inward-looking 
group of US citizens in ‘heartland America’, which – given the vastness of the country – 
demands that any CD effort must ensure a strong presence across the entire country. 
Given the variety of the targeted audiences, this presence needs to be tailored in terms of 
strategy and instruments. 
 
In short, while the US provides a strong opportunity for engagement through culture, 
demographic, political and geographical challenges make this opportunity particularly hard 
to exploit for any European actor, and particularly the European Union as such. 
 
3.2. Willingness for external cultural action vis-à-vis the US 
Willingness relies on the capacity to formulate targets while mobilising support for them. 
 
EU level 
 
EU-level transatlantic CD comprises essentially actions of the EU Delegation to the US 
(EUD). 
 
Target-setting 
 
EU-US cultural relations were first addressed in the 1995 ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’, 
which identified ‘the need to strengthen and broaden public support for our partnership’ 
by seeking ‘to deepen the commercial, social, cultural, scientific and educational ties 
among our people’ (EU & US 1995). Consequently, the Agenda comprised a ‘people-to-
people’ dimension for ‘building bridges across the Atlantic’ (ibid). However, despite some 
EU public diplomacy activities in the US, including people-to-people contacts as well as 
educational cooperation, an official EU strategy for the use of culture in transatlantic 
relations has never existed.6 When the process of policy formulation regarding a general 
EU cultural diplomacy started with the 2007 European agenda for culture in a globalizing 
world (EC 2007), no mention was made of the United States (Schwencke & Rydzy 2015). 
                                               
6 For a critical analysis of EU public diplomacy instruments vis-à-vis the US, see Scott-Smith (2005). 
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The same can be observed for the multiple Action Plans and Work Programs published in 
the run-up to the 2016 Joint Communication, which itself only refers to the US by briefly 
underlining the existing strong transatlantic cultural ties (EC & High Representative 2016: 
14).  
 
Despite the lack of a centralized strategy for the use of culture vis-à-vis the US, the EU 
Delegation to the US nowadays possesses a structured approach to the use of culture for 
advancing the EU’s agenda in the country. This approach does not simply aim at 
showcasing European cultural heritage, but comprises a clear attempt to link EU CD to 
policy issues that constitute a priority for the EU (Interview 2). Central themes in the most 
recent past have been climate change, energy and security (ibid.). The objective is thus to 
use culture as a vehicle for advancing mutual understanding on pressing problems. The 
EUD’s approach also operates with priorities when it comes to the scope of its target 
audience, both in geographical terms and with regard to various societal groups. Beyond 
Washington, it desires to employ the vast network of member states’ cultural institutes, the 
Jean Monnet network as well as new technologies (ibid.). In terms of target groups, ethnic 
constituencies that have no ties with Europe are increasingly moving center-stage (ibid.).  
 
Support 
 
The absence of an EU cultural diplomacy strategy dedicated to the US may provide some 
indications as to the limited level of support not so much to the idea of an EU CD itself, but 
to that of extending it to a highly developed country like the US. Indeed, the current EU 
framework for external cultural policy seems to prioritise developing countries, and the 
appetite of EU policy-makers as well as major member states to – at the EU level (in 
contrast to the member state level, as argued below) – invest into transatlantic cultural 
relations seems limited (Interviews 1, 2, 3).  
 
Nonetheless, as part of the 2013-2014 ‘Preparatory Action on Culture in EU External 
Relations’, a country report was dedicated to the US, assessing transatlantic cultural 
diplomacy and opportunities for future strategies (Fisher 2014). Moreover, key EU policy-
makers’ discourse on the ‘transatlantic bond’ (for instance, Mogherini 2015) continues to 
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display a level of support for transatlantic cultural exchange that finds its expression in the 
EUD’s current practice of cultural diplomacy in the US. Being one of the few EU 
Delegations with dedicated staff to work on culture, EU representatives on the ground can 
be considered as policy entrepreneurs that actively support the use of culture in a variety 
of ways.  
 
In spite of the absence of specific political statements supporting a strengthened EU-level 
cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis the US, practice thus shows that the country de facto 
represents an important arena of EU CD. This is indicative of a strong willingness for such 
CD in the US. 
 
Level of coordinated EU action 
 
When it comes to coordinated EU cultural diplomacy, that is, actions that bring together 
member state cultural diplomats potentially with the support of the EU, the main actor is 
arguably the network of European Union National Institutes for Culture. EUNIC operates 
with a variety of active ‘local clusters’ across the globe, three of which are located in the 
States: in Washington, DC, New York and Chicago (Interview 1).  
 
Target-setting 
 
To date, cluster activities, including in the US, have not been guided by official country-
specific strategies, and have mostly depended on the leadership of certain cultural 
institutes and specific local conditions (ibid.). In 2017, EUNIC signed an administrative 
agreement with the European Commission and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) in view of improving the coordination of EU external cultural action (EEAS 2017). 
On this basis, the EUNIC global office in Brussels (EUNIC Global) has been gathering 
evidence from the work of clusters in 14 countries and their cooperation with EUDs and 
national cultural attachés in order to support the design of country-specific strategies. 
While this evidence-gathering reveals that EUNIC members have different understandings 
of cultural relations – primarily as display of national culture for some; as inclusive 
exchanges and long-term capacity-building for others – existing activities at the 
cluster/coordinated level tend to focus on the latter type (McIntosh 2015). This shift from 
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showcasing EU culture to understanding culture as a vehicle for mutual understanding is 
fully in line with the goals proposed by the 2016 Joint Communication.  
 
In the context of these debates pointing toward a stronger institutionalization of and target 
formulation at the coordinated level of EU cultural diplomacy, a EUNIC strategy for the US 
is currently in the making.  
 
Support 
 
Where EUNIC Global is attempting to provide global leadership to its local clusters, 
stylizing itself as a policy entrepreneur of sorts for a more strongly coordinated EU external 
cultural action (Interviews 1, 3, 4), the US does not feature among the priorities of EUNIC 
members. In 2015, 11 EUNIC members were asked in which countries they would like to 
share premises and work together in the future. The US did not make it on this list, which 
included emerging actors like China and India and developing countries like those in the 
Middle East and North Africa (McIntosh 2015). This absence of the US as a priority country 
is not to imply that there is no support for coordinated EU action among the EUNIC 
members active in the US. However, based on interviews with representatives from EUNIC, 
Germany and France, this support remains limited (Interviews 1, 3, 4). Given their (varying, 
but usually strong) degree of autonomy from political steering, national cultural institutes 
clearly perceive themselves as independent agents fulfilling tasks related to the national 
cultures they are supposed to represent in the US. While this does not preclude 
coordination with other EU members’ cultural institutes, this is far from primordial and 
tends to be limited to ad hoc collaboration. 
  
In sum, while EUNIC aims to create a more strategic cooperation among member states 
institutes in the US, this remains work in progress. So far, the willingness to engage in 
coordinated action has been medium and focussed on certain events, as discussed below.  
 
Member state level 
 
EU member states have traditionally been very willing to engage in cultural activities vis-à-
vis the US, as the examples of France, Germany and the UK illustrate. 
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Target-setting 
 
France has a long-standing and structured approach to cultural diplomacy ever since the 
creation of a Directorate for Cultural Relations within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
1945. CD is now a competence of the Directorate for Globalization, Development and 
Partnerships, whose efforts are supported by a specific budgetary program on what in 
2012 began to be termed ‘diplomatie culturelle et d’influence’ (cultural and influence 
diplomacy) (Schneider 2015). The financial appropriation is accompanied by a French 
Senate report (2017) taking stock of recent developments, challenges and priorities, and 
providing guidance to the country’s cultural diplomacy. In general, the priorities of French 
CD include the promotion of the French language and culture, of international cultural 
exchanges and of cultural diversity, with a specific focus on the ‘exception culturelle’, which 
posits that cultural goods should be exempt from the rules of free trade (Schneider 2015: 
362). Apart from defending the notion of cultural exception in an EU trade context, the 
French CD strategy does not specifically refer to the EU as a framework for external 
cultural action.  
 
This broad strategic approach is also applicable to French CD in the US. Despite the fact 
that a specific US strategy does not exist, the country seems to constitute a priority, as it 
has been targeted by multiple campaigns and programs in recent years, notably in the field 
of education and ‘creative industries’ supporting innovative entrepreneurs (French Senate 
2017).   
 
In Germany, successive governments have taken the decision to invest into external 
cultural policies – even (and especially) in crisis situations (Maaß 2015: 48-51). While the 
general strategic objectives have been to transmit a positive image of a modern Germany 
via dialogue on culture and intercultural exchange, but also the promotion of the German 
language (Auswärtiges Amt 2017), recent strategies include an explicit attention to the 
European context: ‘Europe is also a cultural project. That is why the European dimension of 
the External Cultural and Educational Policy should be given even greater consideration’ 
(CDU/CSU & SPD 2018: 156, authors’ translation).  
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With regard to German CD in the US, the 2018-2021 German ‘grand coalition’ government 
of Christian and Social Democrats notes: ‘To solidify the mutual understanding and trust of 
future generations, we strive for a more intensive exchange with the US population also 
beyond the political and economic centers of the USA, and we wish to promote and 
support institutions that offer a platform for this dialogue’ (CDU/CSU & SPD 2018: 149, 
authors’ translation). A specific regional strategy for North America is defined by the 
German national cultural institute, the Goethe-Institut, in concert with the Foreign Ministry. 
In the US context the Goethe-Institut also tends to underline the importance of European 
cooperation (Interview 5) and the potential of a ‘united Europe’ as a partner for US society 
(Goethe-Institut 2018a).  
 
The United Kingdom has a strong record when it comes to the use of culture in diplomacy, 
most notably through the British Council (BC), which is often perceived as the model for 
international cultural relations and education cooperation worldwide. With the BC 
operating ‘at arm’s length’, that is, largely autonomously from government intervention, 
the central CD strategy at the governmental level has been shifting over the past decade. 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) reviewed its public diplomacy strategy in 
2002 and 2005, each time resulting in calls for stronger government steering. The reviews 
have led to a partial shift from trust-building, dialogue and exchange-related activities to a 
stronger emphasis on ‘nation-branding’ and the promotion of the UK’s creative industries, 
particularly with the 2012 ‘GREAT Britain’ campaign (Pamment 2013: 16).  
 
Notwithstanding close historical ties with the US, the latter does not seem to top the UK’s 
CD priority list. A regional strategy for the Americas was produced for 2013-2014, and 
indicated as priorities the need to continue to present the BC as an innovative model of 
public diplomacy to the US, to advance the importance of cultural relations in the eyes of 
US opinion leaders and decision-makers, to reinforce transatlantic cultural cooperation in 
major cities beyond Washington, DC, and New York, and to generally expand the network 
of private partners and funders for activities in the US (BC 2013: 25). Most recently, the 
BC’s 2017-2020 corporate plan only mentions the US once (as priority for the Scottish 
government), however, and rather seems to emphasize political, development and security 
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issues, consequently focusing on the Arab world, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South 
Africa (BC 2017a: 21, 2). 
 
Support  
 
In France, support for cultural diplomacy has traditionally been rather strong, even if 
financial and human resources dedicated to external cultural relations have decreased in 
recent decades (Haize 2013). This support is also and in particular valid for the US, which 
has regularly been a major target of French CD initiatives. For instance, it forms part of five 
key target countries (alongside China, India, Germany, UK) of the 2015 ‘Creative France’ 
initiative (Senate 2017: 40). However, this support for CD does not necessarily extend to 
the European dimension of CD – quite to the contrary, as argued below. 
 
In Germany, ‘external cultural and educational policy’ – embedded into a European context 
– has long enjoyed solid support as the third pillar of the country’s foreign policy, next to 
‘diplomacy’ and ‘external economic policy’ (Maaß 2015). This is also a valid observation for 
its CD vis-à-vis the US. In the 2017 report of the German Foreign Ministry on external 
cultural activities, the US was depicted as ‘Germany’s most important partner outside of 
the European Union’ and hence a key target of external cultural action (Auswärtiges Amt 
2017: 95). This importance is grounded on support across the main parties of the political 
spectrum, as expressed in the 2018 ‘grand coalition’ government agreement (CDU/CSU & 
SPD 2018: 149). 
 
For the United Kingdom, the fact that the support for cultural engagement in the US does 
not seem very strong is at least in part a consequence of the British Council’s financial 
structure. Its revenues mainly stem from English-teaching and examinations administered 
world-wide (e.g. IELTS tests), which represented 60% of its total income in 2016/2017. For 
the same year, BC income from the whole Americas region was only 5% of its total income 
(BC 2017b). Nonetheless, the British Council is still one of the central players in the US, 
especially given the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the country. It is precisely due to this 
special tie, but also to the fact that the UK has initiated its withdrawal from the EU, that its 
support for European CD is not very strong at this point. This being said, the BC has long 
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been a driver behind the work of EUNIC, and forms of pan-European cultural cooperation 
can be imagined to persist even after ‘Brexit’ (Interview 1). 
 
Altogether, the member states show a strong willingness to engage in CD vis-à-vis the US 
per se, which becomes however weak when it comes to embedding this CD into the EU 
context. 
 
3.3. Capacity for EU external cultural action vis-à-vis the US 
Capacity relies on the institutionalization of CD in the US, the existence of solid human and 
financial resources and of instruments to pursue CD activities on the ground.  
 
EU level 
 
Institutionalization 
 
At the supranational level, EU cultural diplomacy in the US is institutionalized in the EU 
Delegation to the US, which is among the very few EUDs, along with those in China and 
Morocco, to have officials who are specifically tasked with cultural affairs.  
 
Other attempts to institutionalize genuinely EU-level CD in the US have been undertaken. 
In 2014, a Euro-American Foundation was launched to finance EU-US cultural cooperation 
activities. Currently, it provides support to some existing events like the ‘Kids Euro Festival’ 
(Interview 2). In spite of initial expectations, however, the Foundation did not manage to 
raise sufficient funds for additional activities and stronger financial support to existing 
ones, and is currently semi-dormant (ibid.). EUNIC has expressed an interest in a potential 
strengthening of the Foundation’s activities, hoping that it could fund some of its initiatives 
(ibid.).  
 
At this point in time, the EU’s capacity for CD vis-à-vis the US remains thus primarily 
institutionalized in the EU Delegation. 
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Agency 
 
Agents of EU CD work for the ‘press and public diplomacy’ section of the EU Delegation. 
Of the five full-time positions in this section, two are cultural affairs officers (Interviews 1, 
2). Their task is to engage with the general public and press to increase knowledge of the 
EU and support its policies, and also to organize educational and cultural events (EEAS 
2018).  
 
The EUD actively engages with the cultural attachés and the press counsellors of the 
member states embassies in Washington, DC. This includes meetings to discuss how to use 
and/or refer to the EU in their activities. In this context, and in an attempt to reach broader 
audiences, the Delegation also tries to tap into the networks of EU member states’ 
consulates across the US, inter alia by persuading them to also communicate on behalf of 
the EU. As EU backing can sometimes give the consulates a stronger clout as well as the 
possibility to access additional interlocutors in local contexts, they tend to be willing to 
cooperate with the EUD (Interview 2). 
 
The EUD also has observer status in the EUNIC local clusters across the US (ibid.). 
 
Means and instruments 
 
When it comes to the means of EU-level CD vis-à-vis the US, the public diplomacy remit is 
broad, including access to grant programs and service contracts, but also funding for 
events and mobility (Interview 2). A key source is the ‘Getting To Know Europe’ program, 
funded under the Partnership Instrument. Its 2015-2017 call operated with a total 
indicative amount of €1.5 million (Delegation of the EU to the US 2015). It financed 16 very 
diverse cultural projects, run by universities as well as Friends of Goethe, the American Film 
Institute and the Ecologic Institute (EEAS 2018). The 2017-2019 call amounted to €1 
million, which were awarded to five grantees including three universities, the Old Town 
School of Folk Music to organize a biennial ‘EuroFest’ in Chicago, and again the Ecologic 
Institute (Delegation of the EU to the US 2016; 2018), which signals the centrality of climate 
and sustainability issues in the EU-level CD. 
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In terms of other instruments employed by EU-level CD vis-à-vis the US, a number of 
cultural events and initiatives in Washington, DC, New York and elsewhere have been 
organized and supported by the EUD over the past decades. As the longest-standing EU-
level initiative, the ‘European Union Film Showcase’, organized by the American Film 
Institute in partnership with the EUD, presented 44 European films from 27 member states 
during its 30th edition in 2017 (EEAS 2018). An annual ‘Kids Euro Festival’ started in 2007 to 
progressively become one of the largest cultural festivals for children in the country. 
Organized in cooperation with American arts associations, libraries and schools, it 
comprises various activities like movie screening, live performances and workshops 
provided by EU member states and cultural institutions (ibid.). Particularly relevant and 
including numerous events proposed in cooperation with US organizations and venues, a 
‘European Month of Culture’ takes place every year in May in Washington. These events 
revolve around ‘Europe Day’ and include a flagship event called ‘EU Open House’, which 
involves both the EUD and the EU-28 countries’ embassies opening their doors to the 
public with arts exhibitions, film screenings, food tasting and similar events (Fisher 2014: 
20). Beyond the Washington area, the EUD also showcases European music, technology 
and gastronomy at events such as ‘South by Southwest’, one of the world’s largest creative 
gatherings taking place in Austin, Texas (EEAS 2018). Finally, social media also plays an 
increasing role in the EUD’s public (including cultural) diplomacy, especially Facebook and 
Twitter (Interview 2). 
 
While not extensive, resources for EU-level CD vis-à-vis the US exist. They are used via a 
variety of tools and toward different audiences, indicating an overall capacity that is 
medium. EU-level CD tends to primarily take the form of culture for diplomacy aimed at 
promoting other external policy objectives while also displaying signs of diplomacy for 
culture. 
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Level of coordinated EU action 
 
Institutionalization 
 
When it comes to their institutionalized presence in the US, EU member states can benefit 
from an embassy which engages in public and cultural diplomacy activities and/or the 
presence of one or more branches of their national cultural institutes (France and Germany 
have both). Where the coordination of their action is only very loosely institutionalized in 
the three EUNIC local clusters in the US, those EU members with smaller cultural capacities 
desire the creation of a stronger overarching umbrella organization such as the ‘European 
Culture Houses’ that were proposed in the 2016 Joint Communication (EC & High 
Representative 2016: 13-14; Interview 1). The big member states, among them Germany, 
France and the UK, have so far not been actively supporting this form of ‘communitarized 
institutionalization’ in a country like the US, which is why to date it has not materialized. 
 
Agency 
 
The commitment to the EUNIC clusters’ activities and their scope vary greatly across the 
105 existing clusters in 81 countries. Also within each cluster, different levels of 
engagement among members have been reported (McIntosh 2015). As most cultural 
institutes’ mandates do not foresee the promotion of Europe, their staff are often not 
formally expected to engage in EUNIC activities, and are therefore left with a high degree 
of discretion in this respect (Interview 3). These global trends are also observable in the US, 
where the staff of cultural institutes participate in joint activities on a voluntary basis, and in 
addition to their full-time positions (Interviews 1, 3). Regular participants in meetings have 
been the Goethe-Institut, the Austrian Cultural Forum, British Council and the Irish, Finnish 
and Spanish embassies, whereas the Hellenic Foundation, Portugal’s Instituto Camões, the 
Italian Cultural Institute and the Danish, Romanian, Slovenian and Swedish embassies have 
shown some support (Fisher 2014: 20). Proposals for employing a person with the specific 
task of running a local secretariat in Washington have not yet materialized (Interview 1).  
 
While the three US EUNIC clusters in New York, Washington, DC, and Chicago are thus 
relying on the voluntarism of its members, the EU Delegation has attempted to support 
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them – notably in Washington – by offering coordination. As in other countries, the press 
and media team of the EUD organizes monthly meetings with EU cultural institutes and 
officers from member state embassies charged with culture (Smits et al. 2016: 63; Interview 
4). However, some EUNIC members are very sensitive when it comes to protecting their 
autonomy – not just from the EU, but also from interventions by their own country’s 
embassy (Interview 3).  
 
Altogether, the high degree of discretion left to cultural institutes and embassies’ cultural 
attachés concerning cooperation within the EU framework and the lack of dedicated 
human resources have rendered the development of a structured and resource-efficient 
approach rather intricate. At times, coordination may function, at other moments it is 
dormant (Interview 2). 
 
Means and instruments 
 
EUNIC funds are generally rather limited in nature, and most joint activities between 
European cultural institutes rely on ad hoc funding from single members, other national 
bodies or external actors. A EUNIC Cluster Fund was created in 2012 by member 
contributions to further support cluster activities, and it has operated through yearly calls. 
This fund amounted to a mere €112,000 and €127,000 in 2016 and 2017 (EUNIC Global 
2017). While all three EUNIC clusters in the US have applied for support from the Cluster 
Fund, only the Washington cluster has been successfully awarded funding (EUNIC Global 
2016, 2017). 
 
Despite these structural weaknesses also affecting EUNIC in the US, multiple joint activities 
have been undertaken in recent years. On top of several one-off events like conferences 
addressing the role of culture and arts in Europe and in transatlantic relations (e.g. Istituto 
Italiano di Cultura 2016), EUNIC clusters in Washington, DC, New York and Chicago have 
organized some recurrent initiatives and projects. Examples of yearly events include EUNIC 
New York co-presenting the ‘Panorama Europe Film Festival’ in cooperation with the 
American Museum of the Moving Image (Museum of the Moving Image 2016) and 
organizing the ‘New Literatures from Europe Festival’, running since 2003 (New Literatures 
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from Europe 2018). In Washington, DC, a ‘EUNIC Concert Series’ has been organized to 
promote emerging European artists (Austrian Cultural Forum 2016). Structured projects 
include the EU and EUNIC-funded ‘European Creative Placemaking in Baltimore’ dealing 
with the revitalization of decayed urban areas in the US and the EU, which in 2013 received 
€7,000 from the Cluster Fund (EUNIC Global 2016). Another recent example is the project 
‘Plurality of Privacy Project in Five-Minute Plays (P3M5)’, a transatlantic theatre project 
organized by the Goethe-Institut and EUNIC Washington. It addresses the value of privacy 
in the US and Europe. This project was awarded €10,150 from the Cluster Fund, nearly 
1/12 of the total yearly envelope worldwide (EUNIC Global 2017). It shows in particular 
how EU CD attempts to employ culture for the purposes of promoting other policies, data 
privacy issues being one of the bones of contention in transatlantic relations. 
 
In sum, the means at the disposal of EUNIC clusters in the US are limited. Although they 
may be interested in EU funding, the EUD has no discretionary funds to allocate, but can 
only at times provide the clusters (or member states) with in-kind contributions (Interview 
2). Apart from financial constraints to the capacity of coordinated activities in the US, which 
include for instance the impossibility to cover the high costs of travelling artists’ visas, 
cooperation is complicated by the different statuses – and consequently mandates and 
approaches – of the national cultural institutes. Some are government-run, whereas others 
enjoy varying degrees of autonomy. As a result, choosing appropriate CD instruments and 
allocating resources to them in support of an EU-coordinated CD has been challenging. 
Oftentimes, the most acceptable activities tend to favor a ‘diplomacy for culture’ approach. 
All this yields an overall capacity at this coordinated level of EU CD that is rather weak.  
 
Member state level 
 
The size and reach of the German, British and French CD bodies grant them a central role 
in terms of EU cultural relations. Globally, they have a staff of more than 3.500 and a 
network of 819 offices in 137 countries for AF, 159 in 98 countries for the Goethe-Institut, 
and 191 offices in 110 countries for the BC (Smits et al. 2016). The presence of the three 
member states in the US reflects this global clout. 
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Institutionalization 
 
France’s cultural diplomacy is strongly institutionalized in the United States. Apart from the 
cultural services of its embassy in Washington, DC, its 12 consulates across the country 
provide an active cultural outreach, with cultural counsellors and attachés in Atlanta, 
Boston, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, San Francisco 
and Washington, DC. Of the two main French CD institutions, the Institut Français (IF) and 
the Alliance Française (AF), only the latter is represented in the US. Even if there is no 
regular IF in the US, a special Maison Française at the French Embassy in Washington 
promotes cultural relations (Embassy of France 2018). Where the IF depends directly on 
government steering and funding, AF branches are independent. The network of 107 AF 
makes of the US the country hosting the highest number of AFs in the world. In spite of 
their mandate to promote French language and culture, AFs strongly insist on their 
independent status, which includes a legal and financial autonomy from the French 
government that implies self-financing through language courses (Interview 3). Common 
actions with the cultural section of the French Embassy are not a priority, and mostly 
consist of an annual event hosted in the Embassy’s premises and organized by AF 
Washington, nor is common action in an EU context (ibid.). When it comes to further 
attempts at institutionalizing French CD in the US, bodies like the foundation ‘French-
American Cultural Exchange’ (FACE) deal with education and arts projects, occasionally in 
cooperation with the French Embassy and US authorities (see FACE Foundation 2018). 
 
Similar to France, Germany disposes of a well-institutionalized CD in the US. It relies on a 
unit in charge of culture at the German Embassy, a ‘German Information Center USA’ in 
Washington, DC, eight consulates in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, 
Miami, New York, and San Francisco, as well as six branches of the Goethe-Institut in 
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and Washington, DC. These 
institutes are independent of governmental control, but operate broadly within the 
framework of the German CD strategy (Interview 4) and are partly funded by the Embassy 
(Interview 5). Besides official Goethe-Instituts, other affiliated organizations ensure a 
broader reach, also in geographical terms. Examples include Friends of Goethe, a non-
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profit and therefore tax-deductible organization involving a broader network of actors in 
support of German cultural activities, or the German Cultural Center in Atlanta (Goethe-
Institut 2018b).    
 
When it comes to the United Kingdom, the British Council is the main institutionalized 
expression of its formal CD presence in the US. Its Country Director for the US serves a 
dual role, as he is also the Cultural Counsellor for the British Embassy in Washington, DC, 
and has diplomatic status. The BC used to possess offices in Washington, DC, New York 
and Los Angeles. However, the last two were closed in 2017 and 2015 respectively, which 
is why the office now hosted by the British Embassy remains the only official antenna. The 
activities of the BC in the US also rely on ‘Friends of the British Council’, a subsidiary 
undertaking aimed at finding US partners willing to (co-)fund programs for joint 
cooperation in arts, education, society and English-teaching in the US or anywhere else in 
the Council’s global network (BC 2013: 25). As an example, a ‘British Film Office’ targeting 
US film producers was opened in Los Angeles and co-funded by a consortium including the 
BC (BC 2016: 46).  
 
Agency 
 
All three major EU member states can rely on a solid set of agents pursuing the nationally 
defined CD objectives, with limited attention however to the European framework into 
which their action may be embedded. These agents are career diplomats in the embassies, 
but in the cases of the cultural institutes also locally recruited staff. Especially in the case of 
France, the Alliance Française network consists of self-financed entities, each with a local 
legal status and with mostly local staff (Interview 3). For Germany, half a dozen of people 
work on culture and public diplomacy in the Embassy and the German Information Centre, 
whereas the Goethe-Instituts have a staff of more than ninety people in the six offices 
(Goethe-Institut 2018b). In the case of the United Kingdom, the BC employs a team of 
seventeen in the US (BC 2018). 
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Means and instruments 
 
Cultural diplomacy activities of France in the US essentially rely on two types of 
instruments. The first type involves specific flagship projects with a particular theme and/or 
target audience such as ‘Creative France’, which attempts to promote French creative 
entrepreneurs in five target countries, including the US. It was launched in 2015 with a 
budget of €8 million (Senate 2017: 40). Other examples of this type of approach are the 
‘French-American creative lab’ and the ‘club ICC’, both geared towards cooperation in the 
area of cultural and creative industries (ibid.: 42). The second type comprises the regular 
activities of the Alliance Française network. Its main task is language teaching, but AFs also 
organized more than 2150 cultural activities in 2016, which mobilized around 6% of their 
budgets in the US (AF 2017: 50, 69). Activities of big AF like the one in Washington include 
festivals and expositions on music, cinema, literature, food tastings, debates and more. 
Sometimes not only French cultural production is displayed, but also that of other 
francophone countries (AF 2018). 
 
German CD involves a variety of instruments in the US, which are related to pure ‘nation-
branding’ and informational work (German Information Centre), dialogue and exchange. 
Apart from organizing specific events, recent initiatives have included the creation of a 
‘German Academy New York’ as a place of transatlantic exchange, as well as the 
establishment of a German-American group of scientists at the School of Advanced Studies 
(SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University in view of creating a transatlantic think tank 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2017: 95-96). A recent instrument and its importance are underlined in 
the 2018 German coalition government agreement: ‘We will use the Year of Germany in 
the US in the years 2018/2019 to reinforce the societal dialogue in all its breadth and to 
extend the opportunities for contacts’ (CDU/CSU & SPD 2018: 149, authors’ translation). 
The ‘Year of Germany’ provides a means to mobilize public and private actors to make 
Germany and its culture more visible and ‘emotionally experienceable’ in the US, and to go 
beyond the traditional target audiences in the large cities and of Americans with German 
roots to also address young people and the population of ‘heartland America’ (Interview 
4). In general, while the Goethe-Institut acts in close coordination with the German 
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Embassy, it is the former that takes on the practical responsibility of a broad set of cultural 
activities encompassing arts and events addressing social issues (Interview 5; Goethe-
Institut 2018b). The Goethe-Institut places emphasis on the use of internet and 
communication technologies, which allow for a broader reach across the country (ibid.). 
Particularly relevant is also the Transatlantic Outreach Program (TOP), a public-private 
partnership involving some major German companies and foundations that has targeted 
over a thousand US social science teachers and decision-makers in education to inform 
them about various aspects of modern German society. Moreover, a German-American 
Partnership Program (GAPP) supports student exchanges through long-term partnerships 
between schools, mobilizing around 9000 students per year (Goethe-Institut 2018b). 
 
When it comes to the United Kingdom, activities of the BC in the US comprise primarily 
‘nation-branding’ and exchange-oriented CD instruments concerning arts, 
language/education and the use of culture for other policy objectives. In the field of arts, 
this includes opportunities for cultural actors addressing societal challenges as well as 
traditional showcasing of UK arts and facilitation of British artists’ outreach (BC 2018). 
Although language teaching is not a key activity in the US, the BC’s strong experience with 
education is used at multiple levels with regard to a transatlantic policy dialogue, 
collaborations between universities, support to academic mobility and research on 
education and cultural topics. Finally, several initiatives link culture to other (foreign) policy 
purposes, targeting for instance issues related to citizenship, youth, diversity and inclusion. 
For these purposes, the BC was able to obtain third-party (including EU) funding. For 
instance, the 2013-2020 project ‘Bridging Voices’ created multi-level transatlantic policy 
dialogues on the role of religion in society and was funded by the Henry Luce Foundation 
with USD 950,000 (ibid.). Also, the European Commission financed a €300,000 project on 
‘Bridging Transatlantic Voices’ via the Partnership Instrument for 2015-2018 to promote 
civil society dialogue on countering violent extremism (ibid.). 
 
Altogether, member states’ capacity for CD in the US are not negligible – the extent to 
which their actual activities take into account the objectives of EU CD is however for the 
time being rather weak. 
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3.4. Acceptance of EU cultural action in and by the US 
Assessing the effects of EU CD is a challenging task. In general, studies attempting to 
establish the impact of soft power activities are rare and regularly inconclusive (see, 
however, Singh & MacDonald 2017). They often draw on either audience measurement or 
broad surveys. Against this backdrop, this section provides only a brief discussion aimed at 
contextualizing its willingness and capacity by hinting at the acceptance of the EU as a 
(cultural) actor in the US, bearing in mind that EU external engagement around culture in 
the US pursues multiple objectives, related to being recognized as an entity per se (‘culture 
for diplomacy’: culture for the sake of EU-branding), as an entity in specific policy domains 
(‘culture for diplomacy’: culture for the sake of external policies) and for its culture 
(‘diplomacy for culture’). To do so, it draws on interviews and existing survey material on 
public and elite perceptions of the EU in general and its cultural action in particular (Public 
Policy and Management Institute et al. 2015). 
 
Public acceptance 
 
Attempts are made by European and member state institutions to measure the audience 
reach of their cultural activities. This assessment mostly relies on the number of people 
impacted (Interview 2). For example, the EUD produces a monthly audience engagement 
scorecard. Also among member states, measures related to attendance and interactions 
are most common. In 2016-2017, the BC estimated its ‘direct engagement’, including 
‘face-to-face interactions, exhibitions and through social media and digital learning’, in the 
whole Americas region as 3.6 million people, which is less than in any other region of the 
world (BC 2017b: 6, 17). In the case of France, the 2,150 activities organized by the AF 
network in 2016 reached roughly 230,000 participants. Concerning language courses, AF 
counted the US as the fifth country by number of students in its French language courses 
(24,449 people in 2016), and New York as the 14th AF by number of students worldwide 
and the first one in terms of revenues (AF 2016: 45, 51, 69). Similarly, Goethe-Institut 
counted 11,228 language course participants, 9684 exam participants and 22,278 library 
visits in North America in 2016, numbers which lag behind most other regions of the world 
(Goethe-Institut 2017: 109). 
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A 2014/15 survey on the perceptions of the EU and its policies by the US public (Public 
Policy and Management Institute et al. 2015) shows an overall positive perception of 
European culture and lifestyle, most commonly concerning fields like historical heritage, 
arts and food and less importantly cinema, music and sports. These perceptions of 
‘European’ culture heavily depend on the images the US public has of different member 
states, however, with Italy, France, UK and Germany topping the list in terms of 
attractiveness for the US public (ibid.: Annex III 116). Bigger member states are easily 
recognizable, often export many cultural products and mostly have stronger diaspora ties 
with the US than smaller countries. 
 
These positive perceptions of ‘Europe’ among the US public stand in contrast to the fact 
that the EU itself is hardly recognized as a (cultural) actor. When asked to associate the 
topic of ‘culture and sports’ with either the ‘EU’ or ‘Europe’, only 13.4% of the respondents 
to the survey picked the EU, while 38.3% indicated ‘Europe’, 23.6% stated that there is no 
difference between them and 24.6% could not answer the question (ibid.: Annex III 114). 
Furthermore, when comparing ‘politics’, ‘economy’, ‘social development’, ‘science, 
research and technology’ and ‘culture and sports’, the latter is the topic least often 
associated with the EU – far behind ‘economy’, for instance. This signals a clear untapped 
potential for EU action: the attractiveness of European culture as such does not seem to be 
translated into any recognizable role for the EU as a cultural actor. In fact, the EU is not 
wholly unknown as an institution in general – when compared to that of international 
organizations and non-EU countries, EU visibility ranked relatively well, similarly to India 
and Brazil (ibid.: 237) – but it seems to be less visible particularly in the field of culture.  
 
It is worth noting, however, that even the existing potential for acceptance of EU cultural 
action should not be taken for granted. In fact, in comparative perspective, US citizens’ 
attraction to Europe is mostly below the average of the EU’s ten strategic partner 
countries. For instance, when asked whether the EU should be engaged more actively in 
cultural exchanges with their country, only 21.1% of US respondents strongly agreed 
(29.5% globally), 30.1% agreed (40.5%), with 27.5% undecided (18.5%), 16.7% unable to 
answer (7.6%) and a higher-than-average percentage explicitly disagreeing, namely 4.7% 
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(3.9%) (ibid: Annex III 100). Also, when ranking activities related to the EU or Europe that 
they would be interested in, cultural events where indicated by only 34.2% of US 
respondents (43.6% globally), European Film festivals by 15.9% (28.4%), academic 
exchanges by 17% (30.2%) and people-to-people activities by 25.2% (38.2%) (ibid: Annex 
III 125). 
 
Elite acceptance 
 
Acceptance of EU CD must also be established with respect to intellectual and political 
elites, which form particular targets of EU external cultural action. A small elite survey 
conducted in 2014/2015 suggests a high appreciation of the EU’s role in culture among US 
elites (Public Policy and Management Institute et al. 2015). Events like European film 
festivals or Europe Day in Washington, DC, are described as particularly well-received. 
Also, smaller member states’ events targeting diaspora represent a successful strategy to 
reach out to local audiences (ibid.: 248). However, similarly to the public, elites also seem 
to perceive the EU primarily as an economic and particularly trade actor (ibid.: 242). Also 
when it comes to creating close ties with US government and administration around 
culture, EU-level approaches have proved harder to develop. Whereas political and 
administrative elites in many (smaller) developing countries are very much prepared to 
work with the EU as a collective entity, in highly developed and bigger countries like the 
US they often prefer to address European countries individually (Interview 1).  
 
Altogether, US perceptions of European culture indicate a solid potential for EU CD. 
However, culture is predominantly associated with ‘Europe’ as a geographical and 
historical entity, whereas the recognition of the EU as an actor in general and particularly 
as a cultural actor remains weak to very weak – providing a plausible indication that EU CD 
has not been living up to its potential so far. 
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4. The shape of contemporary EU cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis the 
US: explaining its ‘diversity without unity’  
 
This section extracts key patterns from the above analysis to provide a clear understanding 
of the current state of the EU’s CD vis-à-vis the US, before attempting to explain why the 
EU engages with the US through CD, and why it does so in the ways revealed by this 
analysis. 
 
First, the willingness to engage in EU CD varies considerably across the three levels (and 
the three member states). At the EU level, clear-cut targets and solid support for EU 
activity yield a strong form of willingness. The latter is more limited but still present at the 
level of coordinated action. While the target-setting and strategic discussions regarding a 
coordinated EU CD approach are still ongoing, and while not all member states support 
EUNIC action in the US, a group of policy entrepreneurs is clearly in favor of stronger 
collaboration at this level. At the member state level, the willingness to support EU CD is 
weak, especially in the French case, but also for a UK that is in the process of leaving the 
EU, while Germany at least acknowledges the European framework of its actions, and the 
Year of Germany provides opportunities for pan-European activities.  
 
Second, when it comes to the capacity for EU CD, at the EU level the EUD crystallizes all 
efforts and has resources to pursue a set of activities which are partially about showcasing 
EU culture per se but mostly about employing culture for other (foreign) policy purposes. 
The types of activities undertaken at the EU level could therefore primarily be understood 
as ‘culture for EU diplomacy’, that is, culture is used as a vehicle to brand the EU while 
pursuing cooperation on other EU foreign policy priorities, ranging from climate change 
and energy to security and trade issues, even if some ‘diplomacy for EUropean culture’ 
forms of action are also undertaken. Mostly, however, the promotion and display of the 
diversity of European cultures is left to the level of coordinated activities and to the 
member states. At the former level, the capacity to pursue concerted cultural action that 
would genuinely promote EU cultural diversity via a ‘diplomacy for culture’ approach 
championed by some of the national cultural institutes exists, but remains weak due to a 
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limited degree of institutionalization combined with the absence of dedicated staff and no 
particular means. At the member state level, the capacity to co-promote EU CD would in 
theory be strong(er), but is – due to the described lack of willingness – currently largely 
unused. At this level, activities combine nation-branding and support to diplomacy (‘culture 
for diplomacy’) with limited efforts of ‘diplomacy for the promotion of national culture’. 
 
All in all, the extent of EU CD is (moderate to) high only at the EU level itself, but low at the 
other two levels: at the level of coordinated action the capacity is weak above all due to a 
lack of resources, but this capacity is used as much as possible; at the member state level, 
a generally strong capacity for EU CD exists, but it remains unused due to a lack of 
willingness to frame national CDs within a European context (which also has negative spill-
over effects for EUNIC). While a multi-level and multi-actor EU cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis 
the US thus exists (see Table 2), it currently embodies ‘diversity without unity’, remaining 
incoherent and thus ultimately weaker than it could be. The most resourceful EU member 
states are each rather strongly engaged in the US, but they clearly favor the ‘national 
route’ of CD, and their engagement at times features signs of competition rather than 
forms of coordination and attempts at embedding national CDs into an overarching EU 
context. 
 
Table 2: The extent and forms of EU multi-level cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis the US  
 European Union level Level of 
coordinated action 
Member state 
level 
Willingness to engage 
in EU CD 
Strong Medium Weak 
Capacity to engage  
in EU CD 
Medium Weak Weak (used capacity) 
Extent of EU CD  (Moderate to) high Low Low 
 
Dominant form  
of (EU) cultural 
diplomacy 
(EUropean) culture(s)  
for the sake of other 
EU external policy 
objectives 
(Coordinated) diplomacy 
for European culture(s) 
Culture for the sake of 
nation-branding (UK: 
culture for the sake of 
other external policies) 
 
 
These findings call for an explanation. First, the decision to engage in CD vis-à-vis the US is 
– at EU and member state level – supported by policy entrepreneurs who seem to be 
motivated by both interests and normative motivations. Clear indicators for an interest-
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driven behavior are many of the activities aimed at EU-/nation-branding and ultimately soft 
power projection following a competitive mind-set. However, there are – to a lesser extent 
– also genuine attempts at engaging in a dialogue and exchange aimed at cooperation 
with (cultural actors in) the US such as some of the measures proposed within the 
framework of the ‘Year of Germany 2018/19’. While an instrumental and interest-oriented 
use of culture thus prevails, additional motivations supported by other constituencies, 
especially the cultural institutes, also drive EU CD vis-à-vis the US. This pattern of co-
existing motivations confirms findings of earlier research on EU CD in general (Schunz 
2018).  
 
Where a combination of motivations may explain why there is EU CD in the broad sense at 
all in the US, these motives do not account for the current shape of that CD. The specific 
rationale of that activity, as expressed in its dominant forms, seems to be different across 
levels. The EU-level action is focused on using culture for advancing non-cultural policy-
related external policy objectives; the coordinated activity – to the extent that it exists – 
primarily promotes cultural policy objectives; the member states follow above all a nation-
branding rationale. While all this activity could be perceived as complementary, it exposes 
an evident lack of coherence. It suggests above all that, although this is not explicitly 
acknowledged by actors in the field, there is no real interest among EU member states to 
cooperate within an EU context. One may even observe, at least in the case of some 
member states, that they perceive themselves to be in competition with each other. 
Despite the strategic debates around the 2016 Joint Communication and the Global 
Strategy’s idea of producing ‘joined-up’ EU external action also in a field like culture, and 
despite all coordinating efforts offered by the EUD in Washington, DC, and through EUNIC 
Global, several member states display a tendency to rather ‘go it alone’. This seems to be 
particularly the case since the Trump administration, with its rhetoric despising the EU, has 
taken office. While lip-service is being paid to the EU’s efforts, and while events which are 
mutually beneficial to all are regularly organized, such concerted efforts remain the 
exception rather than the rule. A latent mind-set of intra-EU competition for ‘spheres of 
influence’ in the US (Davis Cross & Melissen 2013: xix) thus adds to the constraints that the 
legal competence already imposes on EU-level CD alongside the particular challenges that 
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the US as a target country poses. Together, a combination of a legal framework protecting 
the member states’ sovereignty, the latter’s attitudes geared towards the promotion of 
national interests and the intricacies of an attractive, but large and diverse target country 
may thus explain the current fragmentary nature of EU CD. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This contribution explored the EU’s transatlantic CD to find that a complex, multi-level, 
multi-actor, multi-faceted and multi-purpose EU cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis the US 
currently exists, which displays ‘diversity without unity’ and faces severe incoherencies.   
 
As could be expected, the EU Delegation to the US seems to be most willing to pursue EU 
CD. Within the limits of its resources and legal constraints, it mostly promotes ‘(EU) culture 
for EU diplomacy’ purposes, while also attempting to coordinate the work of the EU 
cultural institutes and embassies in the US. Nevertheless, the extent of EU CD at the level 
of coordinated activities between the EU and the member states as well as at the member 
state level remains low. While a certain number of actors – both from the EU and from 
some of the (especially less resourceful) member states – seem willing to pursue concerted 
EU CD via EUNIC, and share the understanding that this should take the form of 
‘diplomacy for European culture(s)’, the commitment remains often rhetorical. Resources 
are scarce, and activities remain ad hoc and limited. This also has to do with the fact that 
the member states themselves, and notably the most resourceful ones, still primarily 
pursue national objectives. Rather well-endowed in terms of resources, and often with a 
network of consulates and cultural institutes across the US, their primary task and activity is 
to employ culture for nation-branding purposes. Despite their capacity to more strongly 
include the EU dimension in their CD efforts, the willingness to embed their national CD 
into a European context to pursue a co-created ‘national (and EU) culture for national (and 
EU) diplomacy’ approach is uneven, and mostly limited. This has an observably negative 
effect on the level of coordinated action, despite the fact that the cultural institutes within 
41 
 
EUNIC are to varying degrees independent of their government. Overall, the extent of EU 
transatlantic CD is thus at best moderate at this point in time.  
 
This finding can be explained primarily with a latent competition between member states. 
While the general motivation to engage in CD can be interest or value-driven – and is in 
the case of EU CD vis-à-vis the US arguably both – it is undeniable that the interest-driven 
soft power competition that is often taken as a key incentive for actors to engage in CD 
activities at all (Schunz 2018) plays out negatively inside the EU in a country like the US. 
Especially the larger member states are – to differing degrees – in the first place interested 
in employing culture as a vehicle to project a positive image, without necessarily portraying 
themselves as part of the greater ensemble that is the EU. This distinguishes the US as a 
target country from smaller and developing countries, where the preparedness to 
effectively cooperate their diplomatic action around culture among EU members seems 
generally higher (Interview 1, see also McIntosh 2015: 23). Member states’ lacking 
willingness and legal competence constraints thus lead to a situation in which the 
undeniable potential for concerted European transatlantic cultural diplomacy remains 
unused. These shortcomings of joint EU cultural diplomacy are reflected in its acceptance 
by the US public and elites. Despite positive perceptions of European culture as such, the 
EU does not seem to be recognized as an actor in the field of culture, which hampers its 
chances to capitalize on these assets. 
 
These findings may have to be interpreted with a degree of caution, as the EU’s CD is 
generally rapidly evolving and studies of its impact are scarce. Further research would be 
needed to confirm the observed trends, notably by comparing more member states’ CD in 
the US, systematically contrasting EU transatlantic CD with its CD in other developed (e.g. 
Japan), emerging (e.g. China) and developing countries. More significant efforts – beyond 
those undertaken by the EU CD actors themselves, which mostly focus on audience-
tracking – should also be undertaken to measure the effectiveness of EU CD in, and its 
acceptance as an actor by, the US.  
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To improve the EU’s standing in the US and unleash its undeniable potential, eliminating 
inefficiencies and becoming more effective and joined-up in line with the objectives of the 
2016 EU Global Strategy, several steps could be taken. Just like in EU foreign policy in 
general, the resources available in the US could be used in a more synergetic fashion. This 
would presuppose overcoming zero-sum thinking: adding the EU as a layer to their 
national cultural diplomacies – and thus signaling their belonging to a broader 
supranational structure meriting to be advanced as an emerging cultural space on its own – 
would not take anything away from the member states. On the contrary, a strategic 
approach to communicating Europe that has to involve all EU and member state cultural 
actors in the US, and which provides unity on a selected number of cultural themes and 
priorities while otherwise allowing for diversity, would create a win-win situation. This 
would help the EU to build upon its image of a promoter of cultural diversity. To achieve 
such an outcome, member states’ willingness is the central resource. Many synergies could 
be reaped via better coordination within the limits of currently available resources. 
Additionally, however, financial incentives in order to fund joint projects might be helpful, 
but difficult to realize, as even the agreement between EUNIC and Commission 
Services/the EEAS does not explicitly foresee a shared use of funds.  
 
Greater efforts at developing joined-up EU CD would be more than a drop in the bucket. 
They would benefit the image of the EU and of each of its member states, promote 
European culture(s) and cultural actors, and possibly advance EU foreign policy objectives 
more generally. They would also help portray the EU for what it is: a multicultural player 
cherishing ‘unity in diversity’ and openness. This would serve to remind Americans that 
they, too, form a society that takes pride in its diversity, and which strongly supported the 
creation of the supranational EU, whose prospering has been and continues to be in their 
interest. 
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